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THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
PROPOSITIONS IN ACCOUNTING THEORY CONSTRUCTION 
JACK L. KROGSTAD 
Department of Accounting 
The University of Texas, Austin, Texas 
Accounting scholars such as Chambers, Ijiri, Mattessich, Moon-
itz, and Sterling emphasize the central importance of fundamental 
propositions in accounting theory construction. Theory building in 
accounting has proceeded, however, without the insight provided by 
delineation of the respective natures and functions germane to differ-
ent types of fundamental propositions. Accounting theorists have not 
gone far enough in identifying the unique roles of the various state-
ments used as basic assumptions in theory construction. Accordingly, 
premises, axioms, and postulates are differentiated in harmony with 
philosophic substance. Premises are closely linked to systems of formal 
deductive logic and the inherent processes of valid inference. Axioms 
are used in theoretical systems to specify the formal aspects of theories. 
Taken together, axioms deime the formal structure or syntactical 
aspect and the formal interpretational rules or semantical aspect. Pos-
tulates explicate nonformal aspects or subjective dimensions of theore-
tical systems. They capture the essential imperatives or obligations of 
theory building in a specific field and are, thus, normative in nature. 
Ijiri's axiomatic accounting system is chosen as a vehicle to illustrate 
both the unique roles of axioms and postulates as well as the comple-
mentary nature of these two types of fundamental propositions in 
accounting theories. Ijiri's system contains three axioms which are 
patterned after Euclidean geometry in a manner similar to theoretical 
systems in natural sciences. Nonformal postulates are added to this 
axiomatic system and are shown to perform a different, but supporting 
function. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
Fundamental theoretical research in accounting has been 
accorded high priority since the reorganization of the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) re-
search effort in 1958. At this time, the Special Committee 
on Research Program recommended to the Council of the 
AICPA the establishment of a research staff whose immediate 
research priorities were envisioned as: 
. . . a study of the basic postulates underlying 
accounting principles generally, and a study of 
the broad principles of accounting. The results 
of these, as adopted by the [Accounting Princi-
ples] Board, should serve as a foundation for the 
entire body of future pronouncements on account-
ing matters (1958:64). 
The quantity of continuing research subsequently 
directed toward delineation of the foundation of accounting 
(Variously referred to as basic assumptions, premises, axioms, 
or postulates) indicates the importance attached to funda-
mental research by accounting scholars (see Buckley, Kircher, 
and Matthews, 1968:276-279). Chambers (1960), Ijiri (1965), 
Mattessich (1972), Moonitz (1961), and Sterling (1970) all 
emphasize the central importance of fundamental propositions 
to accounting. Similarly, the American Accounting Associa-
tion's Committee on Accounting Theory Construction and 
Verification (1971) and Committee on Foundations of Ac-
counting Measurement (1971) accord fundamental research 
a critical role in accounting theory development. 
Unfortunately, despite all the attention devoted to 
identification of fundamental propositions in accounting, 
the visible results are meager. In fact, a considerable degree 
of disenchantment and skepticism surrounds research of this 
type in accounting circles today. Such disenchantment and 
skepticism do not stem from relegation of fundamental re-
search to a role of minor significance in theory construction; 
rather, it results primarily from the inability of the research 
to identify broad, serviceable fundamental propositions. 
Delineation of the natures and functions of different types of 
fundamental propositions is an important first step in pro-
viding accounting theories with a systematizing framework. 
NATURE AND FUNCTION 
OFFUNDAMENTALPROPOSnaONS 
Throughout accounting literature, the terms "assump-
tion," ''premise,'' "axiom," and ''postulate'' tend to be used 
interchangeably. The thread linking these terms is their com-
mon level of conceptual abstraction which places them at the 
very foundation of fields of theoretical knowledge. Corres-
pondingly, the characteristics of consistency, coherence, 
contributiveness, independence, completeness, and economy 
are widely recognized as being the requirements to which such 
propositions must individually and collectively adhere in order 
to be accorded fundamental status. Of these above, two re-
quire further elucidation. The characteristic of coherence is 
an extension of the characteristic of consistency. Consistency 
is traditionally associated with systems of formal logic and 
mathematics. However, in about 1930, GOdel demonstrated 
that even within a formalized deductive system, strict con-
sistency is impossibly rigorous (Stabler, 1953:146, 251). 
Fortunately, the concept of derivation led to a more flexible 
interpretation of the characteristic of consistency. Derivation 
encompasses both the deductive rules of formal logic as well 
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as the problematic rules of induction. Consequently, "any 
extension of . . . deduction to the concept of derivation has 
to be accompanied by an extension [of the requirement] of 
consistency to [the requirement of] coherence" (Leinfellner, 
1974:14-15). Coherence is a broader, more flexible, require-
ment than is logical consistency (Edwards, 1967, 6:476). 
The requirement of coherence admits ''highly'' confirmable, 
probable propositions to a system and allows for systematic 
relationships of a statistical nature between propositions of 
the system. Coherence demands only conceptual tractability 
which can be either deductive or probable (Leinfellner, 1974: 
15). 
Of these six characteristics, some are essential while 
others are only desirable. Taken together, however, they com-
prise the necessary criteria for identification of fundamental 
propositions. It does not follow, however, that these terms 
may be used interchangeably. On the contrary, their indis-
criminate use fails to recognize useful distinctions in their 
respective natures and functions (for a detailed discussion of 
these characteristics or requirements, see Langer, 1953; 
Eves and Newsom, 1965; Stabler, 1953; Queenan, 1962; 
Mautz and Sharaf, 1961;and Lambert, 1973). 
Assumption 
An "assumption" (or basic assumption) is a proposition 
that is taken for granted. It is the most general or most primi-
tive of the four terms. Operationally, this means that in the 
definitions of the other terms, "assumption" is used as a 
descriptive word (for example, the term ''postulate'' is defmed 
as an assumption which ... ). The terms "premise," "axiom," 
and ''postulate'' denote special types or specific interpreta-
tions of "assumption." 
Premise 
A "premise" is an assumption which forms the starting 
point in logical argument. Rules of deductive logic are applied 
to premises to reach logically valid conclusions. Thus, the 
term ''premise'' is associated with systems of formal deductive 
logic and their inherent processes of valid inference (Barker, 
1974:6-7). 
Axiom 
An "axiom" is an assumption which specifies a relation 
(function or operation) which is permissibly applied to the 
elements (sets or properties) of the system. Axioms explicate 
the formal aspects of a scientific theory. Taken together, they 
define the formal structure (syntactical aspect) and the formal 
interpretational rules (seman tical aspect) of a theory (Lein-
fellner, 1969:110-20). In short, syntactical axioms capture 
the so-called ''pure theory" which has no connection with the 
real world, while seman tical axioms specify the meanings 
necessary to connect the syntactical structure with the real 
world. 
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Postulate 
A ''postulate'' is an assumption which explicates certain 
nonformal aspects or subjective dimensions of a system. 
Aristotle introduced postulates of reality, evidence, truth, 
deduction, apriority, consistency, and explanation as non-
formal propositions clearly distinguishable from the premises 
of logic and formal axioms (Leinfellner, 1966:199-203). 
Similarly, the Dictionary of Philosophy alludes to the non-
formal nature of postulates in its definition of a postulate as 
an "indemonstrable practical or moral hypothesis, such as 
the reality of God, freedom, or immortality (Runes, 1960: 
244). 
Postulates identify relevant aspects of a discipline's 
environment. These aspects include both properties of that 
environment as well as inter-relationships between the en-
vironment and the discipline. Postulates provide the critical, 
background perspective needed to guide the theoretical 
systematization of a discipline. They isolate and explicate, 
in nonformallanguage, the essential imperatives or obligations 
inherent to theory construction in accounting; they create 
an awareness of critical biases, prejudices, and presupposi-
tions which previously lay hidden, partially concealed, or 
entangled in the maze of empirical propositions characteristic 
of accounting. 
Postulates are clearly differentiated from premises. 
However, the distinction between postulates and axioms is 
not as apparent. Ijiri's axiomatic accounting system provides 
a vehicle for illustrating both the unique roles of axioms and 
postulates as well as the complementary nature of the two 
types of fundamental propositions in accounting theories. 
AN ILLUSTRATION 
DIFFERENTIATING AXIOMS AND POSTULATES 
ljiri's (1965) axiomatic system is one of the simplest 
and most concise explanations of historical cost accounting. 
The set of axioms is patterned after Euclidean geometry in 
a manner similar to theoretical systems in natural sciences. 
By examining current accounting practice and abstracting 
from these, Ijiri derives a system composed of three axioms 
and three measurement rules. The three axioms specify the 
syntactical structure or logical aspect of accounting in terms 
of elements and relations defined on those elements: 
Axiom of Quantities: There exists an accounting 
set U, that is, a set of objects that may be partitioned. 
into a countable collection of measure able classes. 
Axiom of Ownership: The property set A of a 
given subject at any time t can be uniquely determinedl 
at that time or later. . 
Axiom of Exchanges: For any object that is adde4 
to or subtracted from the property set ~, an exchan" 
that has caused the addition or subtraction of the 
object can be uniquely identified; and all exchanges 
that have occurred are identifiable, countable, and can 
be ordered completely and uniquely according to the 
time of their occurrence. 
Essentially, these axioms assume that objects can be quanti-
fied via measurement, that the property set of a subject can 
be identified, and that changes in a property set of a subject 
can be recognized by means of exchanges. 
Since accounting is an applied discipline, it must go 
beyond syntactics and also embrace meanings or semantics. 
Thus, the terms in the pure theory are given real world sub-
stance in accordance with the intended application of the 
syntactical structure: 
Definitions: 
i) A subject is any identifiable thing that is cap-
able of owning other things. 
ii) Objects are any identifiable things that are 
capable of being owned by a subject. 
iii) Time is a real variable; a smaller value of time 
means an earlier time, and a larger value a later time. 
iv) A physical measure is a non-negative set func-
tion that is defined on a class of objects and all of its 
subsets such that it is countably additive-it takes zero 
on the empty set-and that two sets of objects in a same 
class are substitutable if they are of a same value of the 
physical measure. A class with such a function is called 
a "measurable class." 
v) An accounting set is a set of objects that may 
be partitioned into a countable collection of measur-
able classes. 
vi) Ownership is a well defined relationship be-
tween a subject and objects at a given time by which 
for any object it is uniquely determined whether or not 
the object belongs to the subject at the given time. 
vii) A property set of a subject at time t is a subset 
of an accounting set and consists of all objects that 
belong to the subject at time t. 
viii) An exchange at time t is a phenomenon at time 
t which results in adding a set of incoming objects (all 
belonging to a single class) to the property set At+ and 
subtracting a set of outgoing objects from the property 
set At., where t~>t- and r11:. 
Unfortunately, a number of critical propositions essen-
tial for guiding the development of accounting theory are not 
captured and explicated by Ijiri's axioms. Such propositions 
comprise the postulate complementation or background 
perspective for accounting. While it is not practical in this 
paper to attempt a complete postulate complementation, 
four plausible postulates are offered to illustrate the function 
such propositions perform. 
Postulote of Objective: The primary objective of 
accounting should be to provide information useful for 
making economic decisions. 
Postulote of Logic: Accounting measurement 
should be embedded in a probability framework. 
Postulote of Structure: Accounting measurement 
should be based on general systems theory. 
Postulote of Human Abilities: Decision makers 
can differentiate between two non-identical sets of 
objects, can identify an object as belonging to a given 
subject, and can identify exchanges. 
Essentially, these postulates add normative obligations 
to Ijiri's system in the form of an objective of accounting 
measurement and epistemological, ontological, and behav-
ioral commitments. They illustrate the type of complementa-
tion which any pure axiomatic system must have in order to 
be completely effective as a framework for accounting. Such 
propositions provide essential perspective for both theore-
tical development as well as empirical confirmation. If these 
presuppositions are allowed to remain undetected in the 
empirical language, observations, meaning, facts, measure-
ments, and experiments are likely to be distorted, inconsistent, 
and perhaps misleading. Additional postulates may be added 
to those presented, or others may be offered as alternatives. 
The important point is, however, that these fundamental 
propositions should be separated from the empirical language 
and distinguished in nature and function from syntactical and 
seman tical axioms. 
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